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Proving Correctness of SCADA Security-Enhancement Models



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Journal of Information System Security
Volume 6, Number 2 (2010)
Pages 4767
ISSN 1551-0123
Sandip C. Patel — Morgan State University, USA
James H. Graham — University of Louisville, USA
Information Institute Publishing, Washington DC, USA




Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems control the critical utility and process control infrastructures in many countries. However, little attention was given to security considerations in the initial design and deployment of these systems, which has caused an urgent need to upgrade existing systems to withstand hostile cyber-based attacks. This paper briefly describes two security models that were suggested to enhance security of SCADA communication protocols. After discussing formal logical verification methods, this research suggests appropriate verification methods and provides a comprehensive list of tools that can be used to test the soundness of security models. Two tools, namely On-the-Fly Model-Checker (OFMC) and Security Protocol Engineering and Analysis Resources, version II (SPEAR II) are selected to illustrate formal security analysis on the two security enhancement models. 




Security Proof, Formal Analysis, Communication Security, SCADA Protocol Security




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